Attorney's Fees
Finally, Former Husband argues that the trial court erred in finding that he had the ability to pay Former Wife's attorney's fees and costs.
"The standard of review for an award or denial of attorney's fees in a dissolution of marriage proceeding is abuse of discretion." Gunn v. Ubbels, 101 So. 3d 420, 420 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012).
The trial court found that Former Husband had the ability to pay for two reasons: (1) because Former Husband's mother paid his attorney's fees and costs of over $200,000 during the dissolution proceeding; and (2) based on Former Husband's in-kind employment benefits and imputed income.
"When determining a party's ability to pay and a party's need for attorney's fees and costs, the general rule is that the trial court may only consider the `financial resources of the parties and not the financial assistance of family or friends.'" Rogers v. Rogers, 824 So. 2d 902, 903 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (quoting Bromante v. Bromante, 577 So. 2d 662, 663 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)). "An exception to this general rule is that income can be imputed based on gifts if the gifts are continuing and ongoing, not sporadic, and where the evidence shows that the gifts will continue in the future." Id. The trial court erred in considering Former Husband's mother's gifts because there was no evidence the gifts would continue in the future.[1] Additionally, because the trial court erred in its determination as to equitable distribution as addressed above, we deem it appropriate for the trial court to reconsider the issue of entitlement to attorney's fees and costs. See Weymouth v. Weymouth, 87 So. 3d 30, 38-39 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).