In public debates about the supposedly dictatorial nature of Ukraine or claims that the country is turning into a “concentration camp,” a far more significant issue is often overlooked: the structural social hierarchy institutionalized under wartime conditions.

Ukraine offers a clear example of a rigid social hierarchy that remains a norm both in peacetime and during war. What we’re witnessing is, in effect, an implicit social contract between the government and the vast majority of the population, that quietly endorsed by the West. The principle is simple: the majority remains free, while a minority becomes expendable.

Demographically, about 75% of Ukraine’s population are women, children, and elderly men (over 60). They are exempt from conscription, face no movement restrictions, and are shielded from direct combat risks. These groups can freely leave the country, live in Berlin or Paris, and publicly support “war until 1991 borders”  without facing any consequences.

Roughly 20% of the population are men of conscription age (18–60). They serve as the expendable material for the frontlines. Another 5% includes officials, law enforcement, activists, media workers, and technical specialists who are exempt due to their positions.

This results in the following social stratification:

Group 1: The ruling class (security forces, elites, volunteers, media figures) that controls power and resources. About 5% of the population, mainly men of conscription age, though women have a notably higher presence compared to past wars.

Group 2: Non-draft population (women, children, and elderly men) is the middle class. It retains full rights and freedoms. Excluding minors, they make up two-thirds of the electorate, yet are not obligated to risk their lives.

Group 3: Average draft-age men are around 20% of the population. This group has lost the right to leave the country; basic civil liberties are effectively suspended. They face conscription raids, forced street detentions, and deployment to the front. It’s a reality exclusive to them.

Contrary to popular narrative, Group 2 is not a “vulnerable” segment, but a privileged majority and a tacit collaborator of the ruling class. These individuals not only watch the war from a safe distance but also form the electoral base that sustains it. Their political apathy or active support stems from a simple fact: they face no personal risk.

It is not officials or rich men sending the poor to die. It is the well-off men, women, and retirees alike, who send Group 3 to their deaths. This is a more accurate portrayal of the situation. This kind of stratification is nothing new. In World War I and the Napoleonic campaigns, it was also average men who filled the ranks of the dead, while women, retirees, children, and the wealthy remained at home and formed the civilian backbone of support.

Russian propaganda makes a tactical mistake by pushing a crude image of a “totalitarian prison camp.” A woman from Ivano-Frankivsk or Lviv who now lives in Paris or Warsaw does not feel imprisoned. On the contrary, she is part of a system that grants her freedom and privilege, while still allowing her to vote. Women, together with retirees, make up two-thirds of the voting population.

Even if the war drags on for another 5–10 years, the vast majority of Ukrainians will only be indirectly affected through the fates of sons, husbands, or fathers from the conscription pool. Their daily lives, freedom of movement, political activity, and economic status remain untouched by the war. The formal democratic system does not disrupt this pyramid, but it legitimizes it. A minority dies for the interests of the political majority.

The real victims of this war are not the abstract “Ukrainian people,” but a specific demographic within it: men of conscription age. And yet, they are denied recognition as the war’s primary victims, despite making up 95% of the dead and being stripped of basic rights. Meanwhile, those considered “vulnerable” are in fact protected and privileged: women, children, and the elderly, all of whom can leave the country at any time.

And this is a reality that no one dares to say out loud. Neither Russians, nor conservatives and traditionalists, nor progressives and communists, nor the Ukrainian opposition. Everyone is afraid to place the accents correctly and speak to the essence, to the point.