Stable Marriage Problem

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stable_marriage_problem

In economics, the 'stable marriage problem' is the problem of finding a stable matching between two equally sized sets of elements given an ordering of preferences for each element.

I'll try to break down how this looks in the heterosexual dating game. A few assumptions need to be made to continue:

1. Marriage or pairing is the end goal of the heterosexual dating game

and

2. Men are "suitors" and women are the "sought."

In other words, women select from potential suitors. These assumptions are somewhat uncontroversial here, although many people here and elsewhere hate the mention of such gender roles. Let me know how much you hate biology in the comments.

Moving on... The stable marriage problem shows that in a set of all possible pairings between the individuals of two groups (the Suitors and the Sought), the only stable solution is Suitor-optimal. This means that Suitors will end up in a match with their best or most-preferred pairing option, while Soughts will end up in a match with their theoretically worst or least preferred pairing option.

In other words, since men typically play the male gender role (suitor), they basically go down the list from most preferred -> least preferred in choosing a partner, which ends with them being matched with their most-preferred woman with which they have a stable relationship.

On the other hand, since women usually play the sought role, they instead go up the list from least preferred -> most preferred, which ends with them being matched with their least-preferred man with which they have a stable relationship.

This is why Red Pill works for men. Building the self-confidence, physical attraction and the charisma in order to act as a successful Suitor is difficult but possible. However, you theoretically always end up with a better endgame than if you just sit around and wait for the suitors to come to you. This is also why RPW works for women. Improving or building feminine beauty so the best possible suitors express interest is similarly difficult but also possible. While this does not make the endgame better for women in relation to men, it at least theoretically increases your chances for a better endgame than she would otherwise have achieved.

Some conclusions:

1. Men certainly get the more difficult deal but they theoretically get the more optimal pairing option in the end. (TRP's "hard next" or "plate delegation" policy on red-flag women exemplify this).

2. Both men and women "cheat" in this game, however.

a) In the absence of the best available suitor, a woman will enact a "best of both worlds" strategy where they place weak men into stable placeholder relationships while entertaining the advances of other suitable men.

b) In the absence of the most preferred pairing option, men will enact a "best of both worlds" strategy as well where they place weak women into fuckzone relationships while seeking other women.

Discussion:

Feel free to poke holes in the theory and give me your general thoughts.

stupid automod